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Abstract
The article focuses on the interconnectedness of foreign policy environments to explain Slovenia’s 
opportunities and constraints for foreign policy action. During the period of pre-independence 
para-diplomacy, the building of an internal and external domestic environment successfully 
turned constraints (no international recognition) into opportunities (applying for membership of 
European and global intergovernmental organizations). In the second period — post-recognition 
— considering the absence of a strategic foreign policy document, the Slovenian internal foreign 
policy environment became a major constraint to seize foreign environment opportunities. This 
affected Slovenia’s accomplishments, notably after NATO and EU memberships were achieved in 
2004. Although the Slovenian internal environment matured during the following period to adopt, 
in 2015, a comprehensive foreign policy strategy the recent turn in world politics (especially the 
European financial and economic crisis and the migration crisis) created for the first time a foreign 
environment for Slovenia that offered many fewer opportunities and far more constraints.
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Introduction
Slovenian foreign policy has received a lot of attention in literature. 
Studies provide theoretical and empirical evidence of various aspects of 
foreign policy analysis — for example, the organization and conduct of 
the foreign policy process and its individual instruments, mainly diplomacy 
(Brglez 1996; Udovič and Brglez 2011; Jazbec 2012), Europeanization of 
foreign policy (Kajnč 2011; Šabič and Bunič 2013; Bojinović Fenko and 
Lovec 2015), analyses of foreign policy content (decisions) (Bojinović 
2005), and strategy in bilateral (neighbouring), regional (European) and 
relevant global issues (Bučar 1994, 1995; Bojinović Fenko and Požgan 2014; 
Bojinović Fenko and Šabič 2014). The least systematically researched area 
remains the foreign policy environment. So far, it has been addressed 
mostly through the prisms of ‘smallness’ and the ‘youth’ of the Slovenian 
state.1 Consequently, there has been limited research around the 
presupposition that — like for all small states — the foreign environment 
in terms of limitations from the international system automatically prevails 
by decisively determining constraints for Slovenian foreign policy (Hey 
2003). In this respect, we propose to broaden the research agenda by 
focusing on the interplay between foreign and domestic foreign policy 
environments. To do so, we first provide a definition of the foreign policy 
environment. The term is widely used in foreign policy analysis and rests on 
two different classifications: factor analysis of the internal-external foreign 
policy environment (Hill 2016) and the levels of analysis of the domestic-
foreign dichotomy of the foreign policy environment (Russett and Starr 
1981; Kinsella, Russett and Starr 2013; Hudson 2014). This conceptualization 
reveals how foreign policy substance and the foreign policy making 
process are influenced by: a) the internal foreign policy environment; b) the 
external domestic foreign policy environment, defined mostly as the state-
building environment; and c) the external foreign policy environment. The 
research question pursued here is how these three types of foreign policy 
environment influence foreign policy, whereby the term ‘influence’ means 
the extent of opportunities or constraints for foreign policy action. We 
assume that foreign policy is a continuous process; hence an additional 
question that we ask is how feedback on foreign policy actions (from the 
1 A notable exception is the investigation of the geographical proximity and historical context of Slovenia in relation to 
the Balkans (Bojinović 2005).
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external foreign environment) affects the domestic external and internal 
environments, either through self-perception or via policy-making.
The structure of the article is as follows. We first conceptualize the foreign 
policy environment and state building, focusing on their interplay. We then 
look at opportunities and constraints for taking foreign policy action. We 
do this by dividing the analysis into three time periods; pre-independence 
paradiplomacy until 1992; the consolidation of the state until 2004 
membership of Euro-Atlantic integrations; and the ‘mature statehood’ 
period, in which Slovenia’s foreign policy orientation is challenged by 
international crises which follow one after the other since the financial crisis 
in 2007–2008. Methodologically, the article departs from understanding 
foreign policy as a policy (in terms of the content of decisions) and as 
a policy-making process (Carlsnaes 2012), thereby employing social 
constructivist epistemological grounds of constant interplay between 
the structure (the foreign policy environment) and the actors (decision-
makers). The three-period historical analysis focuses on general normative 
foreign policy positions in strategic documents (self-perception and 
internal environment) and on selected foreign policy situations leading to 
concrete foreign policy decisions by Slovenian decision-makers. 
Foreign policy environments as sources of 
opportunities and constraints for action
There are two different but complementary approaches to states’ 
foreign policy environment. The internal-external divide follows 
Hill’s conceptualization (2016: 176), where the internal environment 
corresponds to “the social and political process by which the actor 
comes to its choices” (Hill 2016: 183), meaning factors and actors directly 
involved in the foreign policy process. This environment thus includes 
decision-makers (in terms of their individual characteristics and their 
roles) and rules and norms in foreign policy-making (Kinsella, Russett and 
Starr 2013: 13–15). The external foreign policy environment, for its part, 
includes material and semi-material factors of the state and its society, 
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such as demography, culture and image, including geopolitical and 
historical self-perception and consequently recognition of the state (Hill 
2016: 176–184), and factors of international political interdependence 
— international governmental organizations, transnational processes, 
international law, foreign policies of other states and the nature and 
the position of the state in the international system. Kinsella, Russett and 
Starr (2013: Chapter 1), however, use the concept of levels of analysis to 
analyse the foreign policy environment. Levels of analysis are defined as 
“points on an ordered scale of size and complexity. These levels include 
units whose behaviour we attempt to describe, predict or explain, as 
well as units whose impact on individual decision-makers we examine” 
(Russett and Starr 1996: 11). The earlier approach, which used six levels of 
analysis (Russett and Starr 1996: 11),2 has been narrowed down to three 
(Kinsella, Russett and Starr 2013: Chapter 1). These are decision-makers 
and domestic society as the domestic environment levels of analysis, 
and global society as the foreign environment. External material and 
semi-material factors directly correspond to the domestic society level of 
analysis, whereas international political interdependence factors equal 
the global society level of analysis. 
Figure 1: Interplay of external (domestic and foreign) and internal foreign policy environments



















Source: Authors’ own illustration based on Kinsella et al. (2013) and Hill (2016)
In sum (Figure 1), foreign policy substance and policy-making are 
influenced by: a) the internal foreign policy environment and, within 
that, by ‘decision-makers’; b) external semi-material factors, equalling 
domestic society and government levels of analysis; and c) international 
interdependence or the global society level of analysis as the external 
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foreign environment. The environments enable foreign policy action by 
offering incentives and stimulative influence (i.e. opportunities) and/
or constrain action due to negative influences preventing realization 
of some choices. In the following sections, we will elaborate on this 
conceptualization by looking at how various types of the foreign policy 
environment influence foreign policy-making in terms of opportunities and 
constraints.
Pre-independence paradiplomacy: from the 1970s 
until international recognition in 1992
As a Socialist Republic, paradiplomacy was used by Slovenia after the 
1970s. Defined essentially as “the diplomatic practices, the international 
activities or the foreign policies of sub-state political entities” (Duran 
2016: 1), paradiplomacy has also been interpreted as “an instance 
of diplomatic mediation of separation or estrangement […] striking a 
middle-ground between the realist power play and the humanist need 
to connect and to engage with others” (Duran 2016: 4–5). As a former 
Yugoslav republic, Slovenia resorted to paradiplomacy to connect and 
engage internationally. During the break-up of Yugoslavia, Slovenian 
paradiplomacy took on an entirely new meaning: it was used as a tool to 
promote and achieve independence. In this section, we look at internal, 
external domestic and external foreign factors which influenced Slovenian 
foreign policy making at the time when Slovenia was still one of the six 
Yugoslav republics. 
The 1974 Yugoslav Constitution (Art. 271) allowed the constituent 
republics to exercise their individual external relations, primarily in the 
fields of trade, culture, science and sports. These activities were limited 
to what is conceptually referred to as ‘external relations’ rather than 
‘foreign policy’ (Hill 2016: 6); the Constitution did not allow the republics to 
conduct independent foreign policies (Art. 281: pt. 7). Whatever their own 
international activities, they had to be in conformity with the principles of 
the federal foreign policy (Yugoslav Constitution: Fundamental Principles 
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pt. VII). In this respect, the normative basis of Slovenian paradiplomacy 
after 1975 was of a general collaborative nature and not part of a 
political programme with specific foreign policy content. The internal 
foreign policy environment in use was the Secretariat (renamed the 
Committee in 1980) for international cooperation of the Socialist Republic 
of Slovenia. It was established in 1975, and was in operation until May 
1990 when, under the newly elected democratic Slovenian government, 
it was transformed into a de facto foreign ministry (Jazbec 2011: 114). 
The other important institution at the federal republic level was the 
Institute for International Scientific and Technical Cooperation. Both 
institutions were organs of the Slovenian Executive Council, the highest 
executive body in the Socialist Republic of Slovenia. In addition, some 
non-state institutions such as the Slovenian Chamber of Commerce, the 
Research Centre for Cooperation with Developing Countries, numerous 
big Slovenian companies with their foreign representations, city-to-city 
international contacts, international connections from university and 
academia contributed to what Jazbec (2011: 114–116) has called a 
“pre-state diplomacy”.3 The internationalization of Slovenian business was 
particularly important. The introduction of the so-called Yugoslav “policy 
of open borders” in the 1970s allowed for economic liberalization (Boeckh 
2014: 35) and enabled Slovenian companies to trade predominantly with 
Western European countries and attract foreign investments. As it later 
turned out, the infrastructure supporting business ties played an important 
role in the foreign external environment in which Slovenia needed to 
act to advocate for, and eventually secure, its international recognition. 
Last but not least, ties and collaborations should also be mentioned, with 
political movements such as the League of Communists, the Association 
of Socialist Youth and other youth organizations, Second World War 
veterans, trade unions and the Socialist International. Slovenian minorities, 
migrant workers and diaspora also played their part. Finally, various 
instruments for international cooperation were at the disposal of some of 
the aforementioned institutions, such as agreements, visits, declarations, 
publications, mixed commissions (e.g. with Bavaria and Carinthia), 
student exchange programmes and other exchanges at bilateral and 
3 These paradiplomatic links had not been applied for the pursuit of foreign policy goals prior to late 1980s. It was only 
when the Slovenian political leadership started to develop designs for independence that all available capabilities 
were employed (Jazbec 2011). 
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multilateral level (Boeckh 2014).4 Jazbec (2011: 118) has pointed out that 
non-governmental paradiplomacy came to the fore only in the mid-1980s 
when these actors actively participated in the promotion of Slovenian 
democratization. This, in Duran’s terms (2016: 4), can be understood as a 
turning point of “connecting to engage with others”. 
Some of the central values on which the state based its foreign policy 
activities derived from the nature of the domestic democratization 
movement. For the latter, it was essential to assure the legality of action, 
otherwise infringement of the Yugoslav constitution would have given 
the federal government and the Yugoslav Army an opportunity to legally 
intervene in Slovenia (Bučar 2014). Since the federal and international 
legal principles were the main constraints for Slovenian foreign policy 
action towards independence, the politicians decided to respect them 
and act where they were “allowed”: they kept changing the Slovenian 
constitution and, via paradiplomacy, called upon the legitimacy of its 
“foreign policy” decision. Thus, it was imperative 1) to hold a plebiscite 
before declaring independence and 2) to respect the federal constitution 
with reference to the de facto implementation of independence (Bučar 
2014: 205).5 The crucial factor for foreign policy action was thus the self-
perception of the society and political groupings to respect the rule of 
(international) law in order to construct the state as a proper democracy. 
The centrality of a (proper) democracy norm is directly traceable to the 
official documents of Slovenia, not only to the Slovenian Constitution 
(adopted in June 1991) but also to those related to foreign policy. The 
Slovenian Foreign Policy Strategy was adopted by the Slovenian National 
Assembly in March 1991, even before the Constitution was voted upon and 
brought into force. It set the foundations for a normative and substantive 
framework of Slovenian foreign policy. In that document, Slovenia 
naturally identified survival and operational capacity as primary foreign 
policy goals. During that time, Slovenian foreign policy-makers operated 
under the assumption that socialist Yugoslavia would dissolve peacefully 
4 A good example of a platform that Slovenia used for developing closer ties with neighbouring countries from the 
West was the Alps-Adria Working Group, established in 1978. The group consisted of regional authorities from former 
Yugoslavia (besides Slovenia, Croatia was also a member), Italy and Austria (Klabjan 2013).
5 There are several examples of action upon such a normative ground: a constructive role of the existing Slovenian 
authorities prior to democratic elections in April 1990, which served as a mediator between the Slovene public 
and the federal authorities; after democratic elections, inclusion of the Communist Party as an opposition in the 
reformed democratic political system; setting a qualified majority for plebiscite results to be legitimate; and numerous 
amendments to the Slovenian constitution so as not to overstep the federal one (Bučar 2014: 204–209).
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(Slovenian Foreign Policy Strategy 1991: Title 2). That assumption was 
proved wrong, and Slovenia had to fight its way towards independence. 
It entered the war against the Yugoslav army (Jugoslovenska Narodna 
Armija: JNA). The war that Slovenia won lasted ten days (27 June – 6 July 
1991). During that period, the normative ground of state building continued 
to be actively pursued. The most notable example was the treatment of 
soldiers of the defeated JNA. On 29 June 1991, the Slovenian Secretariat 
for Internal Affairs dispatched detailed information to all police stations in 
Slovenia about the legal rights of soldiers and measures to guarantee their 
safety. Provisions of the Geneva Convention and cooperation with the 
Slovenian Red Cross, which detached itself from the Yugoslav Red Cross, 
were particularly taken into consideration (Bojinović Fenko and Šabič 2014: 
49). Another example to illustrate the same point is related to succession 
issues, which later became one of the most challenging for all the former 
Yugoslav republics. Milan Jazbec, a Slovenian diplomat who in 1991 held 
a post in the Yugoslav consulate in Klagenfurt, Austria, recalls that after 
the Slovenian declaration of independence, the Yugoslav government 
adopted the decision to close the consulate. The main reason for that 
decision appeared to be the fear of the government in Belgrade that 
Slovenia would seize the consulate building. However, the Slovenian 
government decided not to pursue that option. Rather, it declared 
that it would “act in accordance with international law” (Jazbec 2012). 
Finally, strong internal support for principles outlined in the Helsinki Final 
Act of 1975 (the so-called Decalogue) is also worth mentioning. The Final 
Act was translated into the Slovenian language soon after its signature 
(Jazbec 2011: 115). 
The ’othering’ of Yugoslavia based on developing its own identity, 
closer to Western democratic values, remained at the core of Slovenian 
advocacy for its independence after the War. Opposing the dominant 
discourse of the federal Yugoslav authorities, Slovenia consolidated its 
identity around the will to implement democratic principles, respect for 
human rights and international law, hoping that such a self-identification 
would help it be perceived as a legitimate actor in the fast-restructuring of 
the post-Cold War international arena. These core values were included 
in the Constitution of Slovenia — e.g. the respect of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms (Preamble, Arts. 3, 5, entire Title II, Arts. 14–65, Art. 
159), of the rights of national minorities (Art. 5), the rights of foreigners (Art. 
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13), of foreign workers (Art. 79), the property-acquisition rights of foreigners 
(Art. 68), the principle of self-determination of peoples (Preamble, Art. 3a), 
of democracy (Arts. 1, 3, 3a), the rule of law (Arts. 2, 3a), of social welfare 
(Art. 2), of territorial integrity (Art. 4), the principles of secularism, freedom 
and equality of religion(s) (Art.7), the subjection of national laws to general 
principles of international law and to binding international treaties (Arts. 8: 
153), the declaration of war and state of emergency only by the National 
Assembly (Art. 92), and the building of national defence on the principle 
of the “peaceful policy and culture of peace”, the oversight of which is 
conducted by the National Assembly (Art. 124).
In terms of more specific goals of Slovenian foreign policy in the wake of 
declared independence, Slovenia had two main areas of cooperation 
in sight, namely to pursue the “best possible relations with the republics 
[…] of Yugoslavia because of economic and many other reasons” 
(Slovenian Foreign Policy Strategy 1991: Title III C) and because of earlier 
experience and ties with Western economies, especially with Austria and 
Italy,6 Slovenians opted to take part in regional integration processes, 
particularly in the framework of the European Community (EC). The EC 
already had a visible presence in Slovenia due to the mediation role of 
the Ministerial Troika, who brokered a ceasefire between Slovenia and 
Yugoslavia at the Brioni (Croatia) meeting on 7 July 1991 (Rupel 1996: 192–
193). The “strategic goal of pursuing EC membership” was identified by 
Slovenia as early as March 1991 (Slovenian Foreign Policy Strategy 1991: 
Title V), whereby membership of other (trans)European organizations, 
such as the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) 
or the Council of Europe, was seen as strategic in the sense of clearing the 
path to the desired goal.7
The second important element of the internal foreign policy environment 
was the construction of the foreign policy system in terms of its institutions 
(the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service and diplomatic missions) and 
processes (Foreign Policy Act). This was the first and very challenging task 
6 For a detailed analysis of Slovenian external domestic environment linkages to Western European flows (history, 
culture, trade) as an element of a cost-benefit analysis for pro-European integration, see Bojinović Fenko and Svetličič 
(2017).
7 For example, membership of the Council of Europe is a de facto mandatory requirement for any EC/EU candidate, 
to prove its ability to implement basic human rights standards according to the Copenhagen Criteria. In its Bulgaria 
Opinion from July 1997, the Commission elaborated on these criteria by underscoring that any state wishing to join 
the EU must first ratify the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Commission 1997). The 
Convention, of course, is the main pillar of the Council of Europe’s law, and every member has signed and ratified it. 
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for the (not yet) independent Slovenia. Slovenia had several experienced 
diplomats who served in the Yugoslav Foreign Service, but an almost 
non-existent infrastructure. Most Yugoslav foreign policy was conducted 
from Belgrade. Many Slovenians who worked on foreign policy issues 
in the federal administration received their education or training in the 
Yugoslav capital. Slovenian authorities began to work on their diplomatic 
networks. This task was set forth in the aforementioned Slovenian Foreign 
Policy Strategy (1991). The document (Title 5) provided for a stronger role 
for a plenipotentiary of the Executive Council of the Slovenian National 
Assembly in Slovenia’s conduct of its foreign affairs. From August 1990 until 
January 1991, these plenipotentiaries were sent to capitals such as Vienna, 
Washington, Brussels, Prague, Luxembourg, Rome, Vatican and Abidjan 
(Slovenian Foreign Policy Strategy 1991). The document also provided 
for the establishment of Slovenian representations abroad, stating that 
“a general principle […] for their operation […] is equal to formation of 
diplomatic representations” (Slovenian Foreign Policy Strategy 1991). The 
forms of these paradiplomatic representations were (Slovenian Foreign 
Policy Strategy 1991):
 ● diplomatic-consular representations and diplomatic missions with 
other states; 
 ● representatives with the role and status of honorary consuls;
 ● common representation with the Ljubljanska banka (a state-owned 
bank) or other Slovenian companies abroad; 
 ● representation of Slovenian national interests through third states 
(those that would recognize Slovenian independence); and
 ● representations together with other Yugoslav republics on the 
basis of a provisional agreement of common Foreign Service, 
where a Slovenian representative would be the Head of Slovenian 
representation within a common Yugoslav representation. 
These plans were outlined to create a proper diplomatic and consular 
network after Slovenia reached international recognition. It was estimated 
that about 35 to 40 diplomatic-consular representations should be 
established worldwide (Slovenian Foreign Policy Strategy 1991).
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During the 1991 War, the military forces and diplomatic service were 
filled with individuals who withdrew from the JNA’s command and with 
Slovenian diplomats stationed in Belgrade and in the Yugoslav diplomatic 
service. A large majority of the latter supported the goals of the Slovenian 
political leadership for independence and actively engaged themselves 
in achieving Slovenia’s international recognition (Rahten 2011: 664–665). 
Repatriation of the Slovenian diplomats and employees working for the 
federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs was identified as a top priority of the 
state during the “transformation of powers” in the process of Yugoslav 
dissolution/Slovenian independence (Slovenian Foreign Policy Strategy 
1991: Title 1). The domestic and foreign external environment allowed 
enough flexibility for this kind of action. The Yugoslav Constitution, laws 
and diplomatic practice provided that, for better relations with national 
minorities, the consular staff in neighbouring states should be of the 
nationality of the neighbouring federal republic (e.g. Slovenians as consuls 
in Klagenfurt and Trieste, Italy). The same applied for migration workers 
(e.g. Slovenians as consuls in Germany and in Cleveland, USA) (Jazbec 
2011: 116).
The external domestic environment was identified as insufficiently 
developed for independent statehood, as the existing system of 
governance in Slovenia did not have the authority and appropriate 
organizational structures in essential areas of independent statehood: 
foreign affairs, finance, taxation, a customs system and the military (Bučar 
2014: 208–209). The build-up of the structures was enabled by the Slovenian 
external domestic environment. Slovenia needed to demonstrate very 
quickly that it was able not only to establish and sustain border control in 
particular (in terms of military security and with respect to control of trade 
flows), but also to keep up democratic standards as referred to above 
(Bučar 2014: 210). 
In terms of the external foreign environment, the factors that played a 
considerable role in Slovenia’s effort to become an independent state8 
are connected both with the crumbling of Yugoslavia and international 
circumstances at the time. In the former Yugoslavia, the Croatian decision 
to follow along the Slovenian independence claims and the empty Federal 
8 Note that here we refer to Slovenian territory as a domestic environment even though it was not yet a separate state 
entity at the time.
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Presidency seat from mid-May 1991 was important. The non-occupied 
position of a Chairman of the Presidium of the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia added to the favourable political environment for making 
bold decisions, because the Yugoslav Army had no supreme commander 
(Bučar 2014: 209). At the international level, the positions of European, 
American and non-aligned states were not encouraging. These states 
had strong reservations after the Slovenian plebiscite and the declaration 
of independence. They accepted the possibility of a reform based on a 
consensus of constitutive republics, but clearly demanded that Yugoslavia 
remain one state. It became possible for Slovenia to pursue independence 
only when this conservative and in fact non-realistic view was confronted 
with radically changed international political circumstances which led to 
the break-up of multinational states. That, in turn, made room for smaller 
states to pursue their own interests (Bučar 2014: 214–215).9 
Foreign policy consolidation until 2004 membership 
of Euro-Atlantic organizations 
As the independence movements in Slovenia and Croatia inflamed 
the former Yugoslavia, which resulted in wars in Croatia and Bosnia, 
Slovenia steered away from its original orientation to sustain friendly and 
cooperative relations with former Yugoslav republics. The war made that 
impossible. Slovenia developed a separate discourse, which focused on 
differences between Slovenia and the rest of Yugoslavia, not to mention 
the Balkan region in general. The ‘away from the Balkans’ approach 
began to dominate discourse in both (public) diplomacy as well as 
domestically. 
9 It is worth noting that the breakup of Yugoslavia challenged an important international norm, the principle of the right 
of self-determination, which was introduced in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. Yet one needs to recall also the conflicting 
nature of the Helsinki principles because they also include the principle of preserving territorial integrity of states. To 
square the circle, “the Europeans chose to adapt their norms to their preferences and apply both principles to the 
federal republics as if they already were States and bearers of national sovereignty and as if international law did 
not oblige them to apply /these two principles/ to the Yugoslav state, its entire population and its external borders” 
(Woodward 1996 cited in Roberts 2016: 12). Roberts (2016: 12–15) has noted in his recent book Conversations with 
Milošević that such change of course was positive for Slovenia but detrimental to some other Yugoslav republics. He 
sees this as a shortcoming of European foreign policy which originated from prioritizing maintenance of unity among 
European Community member states at the expense of a long-term vision for all Yugoslav nations’ future.
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XXIII (79) - 2017
53
The internal environment of foreign policy during this period prioritized the 
consolidation of the foreign policy system at the expense of substantive 
strategic orientation. There was no foreign policy strategic document 
officially endorsed until 1999. The most important element of self-
identification was democracy — respect of human rights, respect of the 
international law triangle and dissociation of the state from geographical 
proximity and the historical context of the Balkans (Bojinović 2005). In this 
context, the ‘away from the Balkans’ approach was pursued in order 
to associate Slovenia with Western democracies’ form of international 
cooperation, proving Slovenia was a democratic country which did not 
belong to the war-waging region (Bojinović Fenko and Požgan 2014: 59–
62). The first example of the Slovenian ‘new approach’ was the rejection 
of participation in the South East Europe Cooperation Initiative (SECI), 
launched in 1996 (Bojinović 2005: 21). Seeking an alternative way to 
establish itself, Slovenia looked elsewhere, primarily to Central Europe. In 
the early 1990s, Slovenia joined the Central European Initiative, became 
a member of the Central European Free Trade Agreement and entered 
into a dialogue with the Višegrád Group (Bučar 1994). Another, albeit 
comparatively less advocated, alternative was the Mediterranean. In the 
context of preparations for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), 
Slovenia began to promote itself as the most Mediterranean among 
the Central European member states and as the most central European 
among the Mediterranean ones (Bojinović Fenko 2010: 85). However, 
those attempts did not result in the desired outcomes. Slovenia remained 
at the door of the Višegrád Group, having the status of an observer. It 
stayed outside the EMP as well. The limitations with respect to these two 
foreign policy ‘slippages’ originated from constraints from the external 
foreign policy environment.10 
At the global level, the record is a mixed one. Some foreign policy 
decisions arguably increased Slovenia’s international visibility. In 1992, 
Slovenia became a member of the United Nations. It presented a 
successful candidacy for the UN Security Council (UNSC) non-permanent 
seat (serving in the UNSC from 1998 to 1999). Unfortunately, Slovenia 
could not escape some negative global public image. The most painful 
10 At that time, the EMP was pursued entirely with the instrumental purpose of joining any Western-led organization. Since 
the European Union had restricted the EMP to Mediterranean states of Southern Europe and North Africa and tried to 
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experience in this respect took place in 1998, when Slovenia withdrew 
from the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), the group it helped to establish, 
and which advocated nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.11 It 
also abandoned cooperation within the Human Security Network.12 In the 
same year, the government initiated establishment of the International 
Trust Fund (ITF) for Demining and Mine Victim Assistance in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The ITF later expanded its geographical scope to the 
Middle East, the South Caucasus, Latin America, North and West Africa, 
transforming it into one of the main actors of humanitarian demining 
activity worldwide (Bojinović Fenko and Požgan 2014: 60–61). These 
positive international engagements were seen among policy-makers as 
proof that Slovenia was “a reliable and a constructive partner in most 
important multilateral organizations […] able to conduct most responsible 
political functions with credibility and success” (Rupel et al. 2000: 7).
With respect to the external domestic environment, the Slovenian ‘away 
from the Balkans’ approach gradually changed into a more inclusive 
(creative) way of thinking about that region; but the path to get there had 
many turns. For starters, an independent Slovenia wasted no time severing 
ties with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). At first sight, that seemed a 
logical move, since there was not much sympathy among non-aligned 
countries when Slovenia separated from Yugoslavia. However, the NAM 
at that time was still an important global player. One should also recall 
that the Movement was instrumental in making and sustaining Yugoslavia 
as a credible foreign policy actor (Boeckh 2014). This helps explain why 
other former Yugoslav republics were more careful in this regard.13 During 
the mid-1990s, not only the Balkans were far away from Slovenian sight: as 
membership of the European Union (EU) and NATO evidently became the 
primary foreign policy goals, Slovenia was highly engaged in a two-level 
game with the EU in terms of bilateral conditioning of the EU accession by 
Italy and Austria (Šabič 2002). The topics on the agenda were foreigners’ 
rights for property acquisition, the status and rights of minorities, and 
denationalization (Bojinović Fenko and Urlić 2015). Additionally, a 
11 The main reason for that was the ‘conflict of interest’. Slovenia entered the NAC as an applicant for membership in 
NATO. It was subsequently ‘reminded’ by an influential NATO member state that several NATO members actually do 
have nuclear weapons, and that therefore Slovenia’s application to become a NATO member was incompatible with 
NAC membership.
12 In fairness, this happened mainly due to limited financial and human resources.
13 For example, Croatia, which together with Slovenia was the first to leave Yugoslavia, kept its ties with the NAM 
(Bojinović Fenko and Šabič 2014: 53).
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domestic critical cost-benefit assessment of potential membership was 
largely disregarded and positive aspects of Euro-Atlantic integration were 
hailed by domestic political elites and consequently the public, with the 
minor exception of a few open academic debates (Bojinović Fenko and 
Svetličič 2017). The ‘othering’ of the (war-waging) Balkans and Yugoslav 
foreign policy accompanied by top-down Europeanization concerning 
core EU principles and values was the driver of Slovenian state foreign 
policy-making in the period of 1992–1998. Ironically, the very same Euro-
Atlantic external foreign policy environment to which Slovenia wanted 
to get closer by abandoning its Balkan identity and connections pushed 
Slovenia to completely change this and reorient its foreign policy ‘back 
to the (Western) Balkans’ in 1998. In that year, in the context of accession 
talks with Slovenia, the EU demanded that Slovenia take an active role in 
South-East European (SEE) post-conflict cooperation schemes. Slovenia 
was extremely reluctant to do so as that compromised its effort to build an 
‘away from the Balkans’ foreign policy profile. Importantly, in the domestic 
external environment, anti-Balkan sentiments were widespread. These 
developments were rather worrying for the then Slovenian government, 
which feared that domestic opposition parties would interpret Slovenian 
engagement in SEE as a reestablishment of the former Yugoslavia 
(Bojinović 2005: 21). In truth, such critical voices were understandable, 
because the public could not see the direction in which Slovenia wanted 
to go with its foreign policy. It became clear that a new foreign policy 
strategy was not only needed, but was overdue. 
Despite being a factor of the internal foreign policy environment, the 1999 
Declaration on Foreign Policy also bears strong elements of the external 
domestic environment, namely a completely changed self-identification. 
In the Declaration, the previous identity-endangering elements of the 
geopolitical external foreign policy environment — in particular the 
geographical proximity to and historical context with the Balkans — were 
changed into opportunities, comparative advantages even, for foreign 
policy action. “Based on its geographical, political, economic, cultural 
and historical predispositions, Slovenia can withhold the stance of respect 
for international law, strive for respect of human rights at home and in the 
world and offer good offices in solving complicated situations both in its 
neighbourhood and elsewhere” (Declaration on Foreign Policy 1999: 8). 
Furthermore, the regional engagement of the state in Central and South 
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Eastern Europe was to “strengthen the position of Slovenia within wider 
Euro-Atlantic politics” (Declaration on Foreign Policy 1999: 8). This ‘new’, 
holistic self-perception of the state was laid out in the 2002 government 
document in the context of engaging within Euro-Atlantic integrations, 
illustrating the Slovenian identity as Central European with a Mediterranean 
tradition and links with South-Eastern Europe, thus as “a bridge between 
different European regions” (Bojinović Fenko and Požgan 2014: 63). 
From 1998 to 2004, the EU and NATO accession negotiations strongly 
influenced the internal and external domestic foreign policy environment. 
Strong top-down Europeanization was present in process and substance 
terms: in foreign policy-making processes, the central formulation and 
implementation agency became the government office for European 
affairs. The latter consisted of bureaucrats, experts in particular fields 
of EU policies. It was led by the head of the Slovenian accession 
negotiations team (Kajnč 2009). The entire external domestic foreign 
policy environment of Slovenia was afterwards centred on the Euro-
Atlantic accession process. It was important to meet the Copenhagen 
criteria, to take up the challenge of conditionality and to address the 
issue of reintegration into the SEE. During that period, the biggest failure of 
the Slovenian political and judicial system (and the government), which 
turned out to be a foreign policy constraint, was the non-implementation 
of the rights of so-called ‘erased’ people. This was demanded by the 
European Commission in 1998 (Bojinović Fenko and Urlić 2015: 115–116). 
The European Court of Human Rights’ decision from March 2014, which 
was adopted in favour of some 26,000 affected former citizens of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,14 officially confirmed the gap 
between the declared and the de facto level of implementation of the 
state’s constitutive identity element — the norm of the respect for human 
rights. As for the EU-NATO accession talks, they consumed a lot of energy 
from Slovenian politicians, policy-makers and even academics, so a 
lot needed to be done. In some way, this was anticipated by the late 
President of Slovenia, Janez Drnovšek, who in 2003 opened up a series 
of discussions with various members of the public about the future of 
Slovenia (Pogovori o prihodnosti Slovenije 2003). Some of these thoughts 
found their way into the new strategic foreign policy document, to which 
we turn our attention in the final section. 
14 For various reasons, they failed to obtain Slovenian citizenship within the deadline set by the Slovenian government. 
Consequently, they were stripped of all rights as residents of Slovenia (hence ‘the erased’), forcing them to file for a 
status in former Yugoslav republics, whence most of them originally came.
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Post-2004 foreign policy: from steering cruisers to 
rowing the boat (in rough waters)
After the EU and NATO accession, Slovenia again found itself in a vacuum. 
All major foreign policy goals had been accomplished, but no political 
reflection on the future strategic orientation seemed in sight. This internal 
environment factor had some important ramifications for Slovenia. 
General orientations, such as development assistance and the advocacy 
of human rights — in particular, the rights of the child — were considered 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as traditional international activities. But 
the non-existence of a strategic foreign policy long-term plan made way 
for ad hoc decisions which Šabič and Kajnč (2014) termed “project-
based foreign policy”: newly defined short-term goals, adjusted to the 
needs of a ‘consumer’, and with very little added value for Slovenia. Such 
‘projects’ were the OSCE Presidency (2005), the Presidency of the Council 
of the EU (2008) and the Presidency of the Council of Europe (2009). 
In retrospect, by holding presidencies of these international organizations, 
especially the EU, Slovenia took upon itself the responsibility to steer big 
cruisers, even though it had no knowledge, no experience, nor even 
sufficient capacity to do so. The presidencies took place at a time when 
Slovenia did not even have a foreign policy strategy of its own, and 
therefore no sense of the direction it would want to take in international 
affairs. Most importantly, it had low leadership capabilities and weak 
public administration as elements of the internal environment, and a 
lack of public support, let alone interest within the external domestic 
environment and the constraints of the external foreign environment in 
the form of the low ambitions of a small and new (member) state.
Considering these limitations, Slovenia has done a pretty good job. Save 
for some criticisms, especially with regard to the running of the OSCE 
Presidency (Šabič 2012), the Slovenian government proved its ability to 
deliver responsible European leadership. The fact that Slovenia conducted 
the presidencies of these bodies without any major procedural flaws — no 
matter the approach, termed a “symbolic challenge” by Kajnč (2009) 
and “playing it safe” by Klemenčič (2007) — resonated well with European 
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states (Klemenčič 2007; Lenarčič 2007; Jazbec 2008). The procedural 
adequacy also boosted the image of Slovenia as a ‘star pupil’ of the Big 
Bang EU enlargement in the external domestic and foreign environment. 
But there is one paradox that is often overlooked when scholars analyse 
Slovenian presidencies. The job was made easier to some extent, because 
each presiding country, notably a small one, more or less runs the ongoing 
presidency agendas, with relatively little space to make its own footprint. 
Slovenia was no exception, but it was able to find a niche of its own. That 
niche was the Western Balkans. The latter were assessed among other 
2008 EU presidency priorities as in fact the only true Slovenian substantive 
choice and contribution (Kajnč 2009). Considering the fact that Slovenia 
pursued the ‘away from the Balkans’ policy not so long before that, and 
that Slovenia increasingly saw itself as a bridge builder towards the Western 
Balkans, this may be seen as quite a remarkable accomplishment. 
But the years of stardom have long gone. With regard to Slovenia’s 
internal foreign policy environment, current and possibly future challenges 
of its foreign policy are based on a highly volatile state of affairs. Some 
challenges are due to the external foreign environment, mostly the global 
economic and financial crisis, whereas others have a different origin. We 
firstly shed light on the latter. As already mentioned, some of the (perpetual) 
constraints for foreign policy-making in Slovenia originate from low human 
resources-related capabilities when compared with other states, as was 
clearly seen in the unsuccessful bid for a non-permanent seat on the UN 
Security Council (2011), foreign policy mistakes from the past (in particular 
the lost cases at the European Court of Human Rights on the ‘erased‘ and 
the Ljubljanska banka bank) and Yugoslav succession-related open issues, 
most notably the border dispute with Croatia (Bojinović Fenko and Šabič 
2014). Highly relevant internal environment constraints were so-called 
personalized foreign policy orientations, which were made possible due to 
the absence of a codified foreign policy strategy. Examples of personalized 
foreign policy agendas would include economic diplomacy by Dimitrij 
Rupel (2004–2008) and environmental diplomacy by Samuel Žbogar 
(2008–2011). Along these lines, one could place the failed candidacy by 
former Slovenian Prime Minister Alenka Bratušek in October 2014 for EU 
Commissioner, responsible for energy union, and Vice-President of the 
Commission. Solo actions of some foreign policy officials have done little 
good to the standing of Slovenia as a credible partner. A good example 
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is the statement by the Slovenian Minister of Foreign Affairs Karl Erjavec in 
2015, in which he ‘forecast’ a result of the arbitration on the border dispute 
between Slovenia and Croatia, which he thought would be favourable 
to Slovenia (SiolNet 2015). The arbiters revealed their decision in June 
2017: the debate about who ‘won’ and who ‘lost’ in this arbitration can 
go on forever. The incident which uncovered unprofessional conduct of 
the Slovenian arbiter and his aide, an employee in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, can also be added to the list (MMCRTVSLO 2015). 
Slovenia was hit particularly hard by the 2008 global economic and 
financial crisis, almost having accepted the troika.15 The previous 
romantic perception of the EU predominantly offering absolute gains to 
Slovenian society turned into a discussion about what EU policies should 
really be all about — that is to say, if Slovenia wanted to assure beneficial 
outcomes from EU policies, it could only do so through a much more 
active engagement in EU policy-making with regard to issues in its interest 
(Bojinović Fenko 2016). A warning was issued that the EU is not a system 
that would meet Slovenian values and national interests automatically, 
but might even jeopardize them (Lovec 2012). We evaluate this turn as 
a positive one per se. The public and the government became aware 
of the need to work much more substantively on European (and wider) 
foreign policy goals and analyse ex ante potential negative effects of 
international cooperation. Solidarity and equality, for example, had 
been reiterated as fundamental values after the Slovenian—and some 
governments of other EU member states — sensed that they were in an 
unequal position among Eurozone states as to how the Greek bailout 
had been handled, especially with regard to individual responsibilities 
(Bojinović Fenko and Svetličič 2017). This extends more generally into 
the domestic external environment, as national policy-makers are now 
being much more directly scrutinized with respect to meeting principles of 
democratic governance (in terms of responsibility of individual politicians 
and transparency of decision-making processes), especially with regard 
to management of state-owned companies, implementation of anti-
corruption measures, rule of law and fiscal sustainability. The economic 
crisis thus had a huge impact on the functioning of the domestic political 
15 Slovenia had to resolve economic and fiscal problems and, during the period from April to June 2013, was seriously 
threatened by the European Commission that, should it not be able to resolve the issue of its budgetary imbalance on 
its own, it would to have to accept the intervention of the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank 
and the European Commission (the troika) (Bojinović Fenko and Svetličič 2017). 
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system due to its high dependence on EU policy-making and policies. The 
uncertainties brought about by the crisis led to domestic political changes 
in mid-2014 in Slovenia. Early parliamentary elections and the emergence 
of an entirely new political party took place,16 a party whose platform 
was based on the value of rule of law, transparent and responsible policy-
making, and clean slate politicians to lead the government coalition.
These circumstances in the external domestic environment helped create 
a political climate in favour of writing a new foreign policy strategic 
document. Between the 1999 Declaration on Foreign Policy and 2015, 
the only clear Slovenian foreign policy document addressed the Western 
Balkans.17 The process of codifying a new foreign policy strategy, headed 
by diplomat turned ambassador to the Czech Republic, Leon Marc, 
responded to the increasing public impatience with the government. Never 
before had a foreign policy document been so open to public debate as 
this draft foreign policy strategy. In countless sessions—many of them open 
to the interested public—foreign policy planners received rich material to 
work with, with plenty of new ideas and thoughts that eventually made 
it into the final text. The document was adopted in 2015 (Foreign Policy 
Strategic Document 2015). What seems of particular importance is that 
the writers were very much aware of how closely interlinked domestic and 
foreign affairs are in a country’s life; in fact, there is even one sub-chapter 
devoted solely to explaining the interdependence between domestic 
and foreign affairs (Foreign Policy Strategic Document 2015: Chapter 1.3). 
According to Breuning’s conceptualization of Ministries of Foreign Affairs 
(MFAs) as insulated and embedded agencies, the Slovenian MFA used 
to be a highly insulated agency (Bojinović Fenko and Šabič 2014: 51). 
However, the preparation of this strategic document strongly reflects a 
change in this respect and outlines the building of a “culture of foreign 
policy” (Foreign Policy Strategic Document 2015: 9–10). This potentially 
led to making the MFA an embedded agency within the political system, 
functioning via the transparent rules and organizational practices of other 
public institutions. In this vein, the MFA organized in 2016 and 2017 a range 
of expert debates (which included scholars, members of think tanks and 
the business community) on Slovenian future engagement in the EU and 
16 The party was named Stranka Mira Cerarja (SMC: The Party of Miro Cerar) after its president, a professor of international 
constitutional law and previous former legal advisor to several Slovenian governments. In early 2015, the party 
renamed itself Stranka modernega centra (SMC: The Party of the Modern Centre). 
17 The National Assembly in 2010 adopted a strategic document on the Western Balkans, which has ever since been 
operationalized in yearly action plans by the MFA. 
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other international organizations.18 Additionally, in 2015 the MFA renewed 
its practices of recruiting new diplomatic staff, which has since been run 
via an open call for ten junior diplomats a year on profession-specific and 
entirely meritocratic selection criteria.19 
With respect to the external foreign environment, the international 
political context, from the perspective of the developed North in general 
and Europe in particular, has drastically changed. Besides conventional 
threats that European countries, like any others, face today (international 
terrorism, ethnic conflicts, disrespect of international law), Slovenia’s 2015 
document made a specific reference to the rise of populism, as well as to 
the challenge of illegal migration and refugees. It clearly emphasized the 
dire consequences Europe (and, of course, Slovenia) might face if the ill 
response to outside challenges were to result, internally, in reducing some 
important rights such as free movement of labour within the EU, and, 
externally, in severe weakening of the EU as a global actor (Foreign Policy 
Strategic Document 2015: 6). The migration crisis of 2015–2016 triggered a 
set of challenges that may have a considerable impact on Slovenia with 
regard to its neighbourhood and beyond. The cooperation with Balkan 
countries during the migration crisis has proved to be not only a value 
but also a (functional) necessity. The management and eventual closure 
of the so-called Balkan route20 would have been impossible without the 
cooperation of critical countries such as Serbia and Macedonia. Yet, at 
the same time, of all its neighbours, Slovenia has the tensest relations with 
Croatia, a country which is a critical player in efforts to sustain stability in 
the Balkans. The prospect of good relations with other neighbours in lieu 
of decision-making and policy-making at the EU level is also not good. 
Hungary has fenced itself off, ostensibly because of the refugee threat. 
Austria insists on an indefinite ‘temporary’ measure to check the flow of 
passengers on its border with Slovenia, a Schengen state. Italy, on the 
other hand, continues to be a popular entry point for migrants. Slovenian 
Prime Minister Cerar reacted to these developments in February 2015 
when, during the EU mini summit, he voiced strong criticism of the EU’s 
18 It is worth mentioning that Slovenian expert public opinion is gradually being liberated from academia and politics 
in the form of independent think tanks (e.g. Institute for Strategic Solutions formed in 2011 or Think Europe founded in 
2016).
19 This withdrawal from previous occasional or sometimes prevailing exceptionalism in the recruitment and advancement 
practices of MFA (party links, nepotism, etc.) was ironically ended with the help of the economic crisis, which levelled 
the austerity measures in all ministries. On the effect of crisis on capital-based Slovenian experts in the Council of the 
EU working groups, see Bojinović Fenko and Lovec (2015). 
20 Before its closure, this route was very popular with refugees and migrants who tried to make their way to the West.
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handling of the migration crisis and the potential of its mismanagement 
to tear apart the EU: “If we don’t find a solution today, if we don’t do 
everything we can today, then it is the end of the European Union as 
such” (World Post 2015). In January 2016, he additionally called for a joint 
European solution, including common EU measures and external border 
management, in his letter to the leaders of the EU and the countries 
along the Balkan migration route.21 Beside the traditional external foreign 
environment challenges (e.g. being a small state), foreign policies of 
neighbouring states and states of Central and Eastern Europe more widely, 
coupled with the inability of the EU to conduct resolute and consistent 
policy promises on migration management, have recently become a big 
constraint for Slovenia. 
Conclusion
Foreign policy decisions taken by Slovenia during the period 1975–1992 
can be explained via the interplay of all foreign policy environments. The 
internal environment at the very end of this pre-recognition period was an 
important constraint, but was neutralized via paradiplomatic activities. As 
a former Yugoslav republic with limited means of foreign representation, 
Slovenia had to rely on individuals from the Yugoslav diplomacy and, from 
the late 1980s onwards, extensively on non-governmental organizations, 
most notably social and political organizations, academia and companies 
doing business abroad. Domestic and international legitimacy were 
being pursued via the prioritization of democratic norms, especially the 
rule of law and the respect for international law in domestic and foreign 
policy. The foreign policy system and external domestic environment were 
being quickly built while benefiting from positive historical and political 
geography (e.g. valuable experience of doing business with the West). 
The internal and domestic external environments were built systematically 
to make the necessary change from the constraints of state formation 
to opportunities for domestic and foreign policy action. Of course, it was 
the change in the external foreign environment — the fall of the Socialist 
21 The letter is available in full text on the Slovenian Government web page (Vlada Repulike Slovenije 2016).
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Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the growing support in the West for 
democratization in former Communist countries via reinterpretation of 
principles of international law — that represented a great opportunity 
to implement plans for independence and eventually international 
recognition.
In the second period (1992–2004), the main foreign policy constraint was 
the geopolitical and historical proximity to the war-waging former Yugoslav 
republics as the external domestic environment, which posed a threat to 
Slovenia’s effort to create an image of a democratic, rule of (international) 
law respecting state. The external foreign environment again offered 
opportunities for action, albeit not necessarily always in Slovenia’s favour. 
Firstly, the chances for Slovenia to become a member of Euro-Atlantic 
organizations became linked with the political condition to replace its 
‘away from the Balkans’ policy with a more proactive approach towards 
the region. Secondly, persistent pressure from European institutions — most 
notably the EU — was being put on Slovenia with reference to the state 
systemic transition to democracy and a market economy (the shape 
of the external domestic environment). During that period, Slovenian 
decision-makers learned that effective implementation of conditions 
set by foreign bilateral or multilateral authorities was valued not only 
in de facto progress to membership status but also in the continuous 
positive perception of Slovenia as the so called ‘star pupil’. However, this 
enormous non-critical obedience to the foreign environment also led to 
mistakes. These mistakes proved huge constraints for Slovenian foreign 
policy (e.g. lost court cases before the ECHR on the ‘erased’ and the 
Ljubljanska banka, other open succession issues including arbitration on 
the border with Croatia, and an ambiguous attitude towards the NAM). If 
the international community did not put pressure on Slovenia to conform 
to certain commonly accepted policies or laws, the internal and external 
domestic environments would not have the capabilities (or will) to identify 
some major problems with the non-implementation of respect for human 
rights and the rule of (international) law, the very principles on which 
Slovenian identity is built. With regard to this period, we conclude that the 
foreign external environment represented itself as an opportunity to be 
taken, but the internal and external domestic environments became a 
decisive long-term constraint. 
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As for the post-2004 period, after NATO and EU accession, Slovenia 
suffered ‘foreign policy fatigue’ in the internal environment. The 
1999 strategy, focusing primarily on achieving membership of NATO 
and the EU, was, with the exception of the Western Balkans and the 
bridge-building agenda, obsolete. Yet no document followed it. The 
vacuum was filled by occasional appearances in the role of holders 
of presidencies of international organizations. Because the Slovenia-
led presidencies were, by general acclaim, done well, once again the 
external foreign environment strengthened the image of the foreign 
policy of a successful state. The main constraint was primarily in the 
internal environment. Slovenian governments one after the other failed 
to provide a comprehensive reflection of Slovenia’s place and direction 
in the world. Some ministers of foreign affairs used that ‘empty space’ 
to their own advantage and ran personalized foreign policy agendas. 
These constraints, however, are addressed in the new foreign policy 
strategy which Slovenia adopted in 2015. Other challenges to Slovenian 
foreign policy were seen, especially in the global economic and financial 
crisis. Paradoxically, the very environment which the state previously 
uncritically praised (advantages and opportunities of being a member 
of the EU) now pushed the decision-makers and the public to renew their 
self-identification and perception of EU integration. The migration crisis 
brought about more solo foreign policies of neighbouring states and 
states of wider Central and Eastern Europe, coupled with the inability of 
the EU to conduct resolute and consistent policy promises on migration 
management. This leads us to the (worrying) conclusion that the external 
foreign environment, which up to now has offered most opportunities for 
Slovenian foreign policy action, has recently become a big constraint. 
This can help explain why Slovenia has reacted rather ambiguously to the 
migration crisis by appealing to strengthening this foreign environment 
via common action but at the same time refraining from its own highly 
self-praised human rights advocacy, moving instead to securitizing the 
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